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Abstract
The analysis of inflation’s effect on investment can contribute to a deeper understanding of the 
benefits of a monetary policy oriented towards price stability. It can also help conduct such a policy 
effectively.  We  begin  with  a  review  of  conclusions  about  the  inflation-investment  relationship 
that  can  be  drawn  from  traditional  monetary  models  with  exogenous  growth  and  no  market 
imperfections.  As  these  conclusions  are  ambiguous,  models  of  this  type  could  lead  economic 
decision-makers  to  fail  to  take  proper  account  of  inflation’s  impact  on  investment.  We  then 
survey research which, contrary to monetary exogenous growth models, takes account of market 
imperfections such as the asymmetry of information, uncertainty and nominal rigidities in the tax 
system. The analysis of the significance of these imperfections for the direction and magnitude of 
the relationship between inflation and investment forms the bulk of the article. We highlight, on 
the one hand, the key assumptions of the particular theories (and whether they are in keeping with 
stylized facts), and, on the other hand, the difficulties that empirical research faces when trying to 
verify the conclusions from these theories. Finally, we offer some conclusions on the basis of the 
conducted survey.
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“  If there is anything in the world which ought to be stable it is money,   
the measure of everything which enters the channels of trade”.
Le Blanc (1690; quoted after Einaudi 1953, p. 233)
“  Policies that impede the accurate perception of real costs are ipso facto 
inimical to growth. Inflation is the most obvious, probably the most 
pervasive, and almost certainly the most noxious of such policies”.
Harberger (1998, p. 21)
1. Introductory remarks
Price stability is becoming the chief monetary-policy goal for an increasing number of central 
banks. In addition to dynamic inconsistency, the reason why the main monetary policy goal is 
formulated in this way is the conviction that inflation, at least above a certain level, impedes 
economic  growth.  It  seems,  however,  that  in  economists’  debates  about  inflation’s  impact  on 
economic  growth  insufficient  attention  is  paid  to  one  of  the  channels  of  this  impact,  namely 
inflation’s effect on corporate investment decisions. No consensus exists in the literature either 
about the magnitude or the precise mechanism of this impact. At the same time it is difficult 
to  confirm  empirically  the  significance  of  the  impact  on  investment  of  those  variables  which 
according to major theories constitute investment’s main determinants and which in consequence 
have an influence on the predictions formulated for the needs of monetary policy.
  The analysis of inflation’s effect on investment can contribute to a deeper understanding of 
the benefits of a monetary policy oriented towards price stability. It can also help conduct such 
a policy effectively. These are the two reasons, important from the perspective of both the theory 
and practice of monetary policy, why we have decided to take up this topic.
 Several channels of inflation’s impact on investment have been identified in the literature. 
What  is  surprising,  however,  is  that,  to  the  best  of  our  knowledge,  a comprehensive  survey 
analyzing the conclusions from existing research on these mechanisms does not exist. There 
are surveys analyzing the impact of inflation on economic growth (e.g. Temple 2000) or surveys 
related to the specific topics relevant for the inflation-investment relationship (e.g. investment 
under  uncertainty,  see  Carruth  et  al.  2000),  however  they  do  not  contain  a systematic  and 
comprehensive analysis of the various mechanisms of inflation’s impact on investment that are 
discussed in the literature. This article is an attempt to fill this gap. On the one hand, the operation 
of the particular mechanisms is outlined. Special attention is paid to the key assumptions of the 
various theories and to how they correspond to the stylized facts about relationships present 
in  a real-world  economy.  On  the  other  hand,  the  results  of  empirical  research  verifying  the 
significance of the particular mechanisms of inflation’s influence are presented. At the same 
time the difficulties with conducting such research are highlighted. The article consists of five 
sections (numbered 2 to 6).Inflation and corporate investment… 
In the second section, which is a point of departure for further discussion, we examine the 
conclusions  from  monetary  exogenous  growth  models.  The  models  discussed  in  this  section 
assume a lack of market imperfections, such as the asymmetry of information, uncertainty or 
nominal rigidities in the tax system. The significance of these imperfections for the way in which 
inflation influences investment is discussed in the following sections.
The third section contains a survey of that line of research on the link between inflation 
and corporate investment which takes account of the asymmetry of information between the 
investor and the firm. This asymmetry can restrict access to capital for some firms and make it 
impossible for them to realize profitable investment projects. Inflation amplifies these negative 
effects.
In the fourth section we survey studies which take account of the fact that firms make decisions 
in the presence of uncertainty.
In  the  fifth  section  we  discuss  research  in  which  inflation  impacts  corporate  investment 
through tax laws.
The sixth section is a summary of the main conclusions from the surveyed research within the 
context of their relevance for monetary policy.
2. Inflation and investment in monetary growth models
As the focus of this article is on the link between investment and inflation, in this section we 
concentrate on conclusions about this relationship that can be drawn from monetary exogenous 
growth models. On the one hand, given the various methods of introducing money into these 
models, they are sufficient tools to analyze fully inflation’s effect on investment. In these models 
capital inputs are usually the only proximate cause of economic growth whose growth rate is not 
exogenously assumed but carefully analyzed. On the other hand, in contrast to some endogenous 
growth models, these models have analytic solutions. 
  The first exogenous growth model taking account of inflation’s impact on investment was 
presented  by  Tobin  (1965).  He  introduced  into  the  neoclassical  model  money  issued  by  the 
government in order to finance public expenditure. In the model capital inputs depend on the 
relation in which wealth (constant by assumption) is allocated between capital and real money 
balances. If the return on real money balances declines, a part of wealth is reallocated to capital. As 
the opportunity cost of holding wealth in the form of money is equal to the nominal interest rate, 
that is the sum of inflation and the marginal product of capital, a rise in inflation causes a decline 
in real money balances and an increase in capital.
 In order for the portfolio composition effect to have an impact on the capital stock in line with 
Tobin’s model, it is necessary to assume that the saving rate is independent of the inflation rate. 
Levhari and Patinkin (1968) have demonstrated that if the above assumption is relaxed and the 
saving rate is a function of the portfolio’s assets’ (money and capital) rates of return, the Tobin effect 
need not occur. On the other hand, Dornbusch and Frenkel (1973) have shown that if one assumes 
a positive impact of inflation on consumption, the Tobin effect is reversed.
1    A detailed discussion of the models presented in this section can be found in Ciżkowicz, Hołda, Rzońca (2009).P. Ciżkowicz, M. Hołda, A. Rzońca 
 One of the first attempts to eliminate the assumptions that formed the basis of the critique 
of Tobin’s model was made by Sidrauski (1967). In the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model, in which 
the saving rate is endogenous, he introduced money directly into the household utility function. 
In the Money-in-Utility-Function (MIUF) models, the steady-state level of capital is independent 
of the inflation rate. But whether inflation has an impact on the level and the rate of capital 
accumulation outside of the steady-state depends on the form of the utility function (see Fischer 
1979 or Asako 1983). The direction of inflation’s potential impact can be determined by the risk 
aversion coefficient, which, depending on the values it takes, gives money and capital the features 
of substitute or complementary goods respectively.
The lack of capital inputs’ dependence on inflation in the MIUF model is rather a special 
case than a rule for monetary growth models. In order for this dependence to arise it suffices to 
assume that leisure is another argument of the utility function, besides consumption and real 
money balances (Brock 1974). In a model modified in this way this relationship does not occur 
only in the case of a special form of the utility function (utility function separable with respect to 
money). Otherwise inflation has an impact on capital outlays, but the direction of this influence is 
ambiguous and depends on the assumed forms of the utility and production functions.
This problem can be partly (but only partly) eliminated by assuming that money is not an 
indirect but a direct source of utility allowing to lower transaction costs measured in units of 
consumption or units of labour input (see e.g. Brock 1974). In models based on this assumption, 
such as the Shopping-Costs (SC) or Shopping-Time (ST) models with elastic supply, the sign of the 
relationship between capital and inflation does not depend on assumptions about the signs of the 
partial derivatives, respectively, of the marginal utility of consumption and the marginal utility of 
leisure with respect to the real money stock. It does not depend on assumptions about relationships 
between  these  derivatives  either.  The  same  results  can  be  obtained  by  imposing  the  Cash-in-
Advance (CIA) constraint (Clower 1967; Grandmont, Younes 1972; Lucas 1980) on consumption 
(Gomme 1997). More on the equivalence between the MIUF, SC, ST and CIA concepts can be found, 
inter alia, in Wang and Yip (1992) and Zhang (2000).
 Another modification which makes capital inputs dependent on inflation in the steady-state 
is the introduction of money into the production function (Fischer 1974). However, in Money-in-
Production-Function models this relationship is still ambiguous. A rise in inflation lowers the 
steady-state  level  of  capital  if  capital  and  money  are  complementary  inputs  in  the  production 
process and the production function exhibits decreasing returns to scale with respect to capital 
inputs and the money stock. Each of these assumptions is arbitrary. The assumptions necessary 
in  order  for  inflation  to  have  a negative  or  a positive  impact  on  capital  accumulation  can  be 
given a deeper interpretation through the introduction of transaction costs expressed in units of 
production. However, this does not eliminate the ambiguity regarding the direction of inflation’s 
impact on capital accumulation.
 A clearly negative dependence between capital and inflation can be obtained by introducing the 
CIA condition into exogenous growth models, where the CIA constraint must apply to purchases 
of investment goods (see e.g. Stockman 1981). In such a model, and similarly to MIPF models, the 
negative sign of inflation’s impact on capital inputs is a consequence of the complementarity of 
money and capital (Orphanides, Solow 1990). Relaxing this assumption and narrowing the CIA 
constraint to purchases of consumption goods makes any impact of inflation on capital inputs Inflation and corporate investment… 
(assuming inelastic labour supply) disappear (Abel 1985, 1987) – similarly to MIUF models and SC 
models with transaction costs expressed in units of consumption.
In summary, depending on the model a rise in inflation can either increase, decrease or leave 
capital inputs unchanged. It is difficult to indicate which of the presented approaches reflects best 
money’s actual role in the economy because money is introduced into all these models based on ad 
hoc assumptions. Moreover, the direction of inflation’s effect on capital accumulation, even within 
a single model, depends fully on the assumptions made, and it is difficult to verify empirically in 
an unambiguous manner whether these assumptions are valid.
A new and interesting approach to introducing money into growth models are monetary search 
models in which the point of departure is the exchange process itself, described by a mechanism of 
bilateral adjustments between the transaction counterparties. Such an approach allows a more realistic 
description, compared to the one based on ad hoc assumptions, of money’s role as a good facilitating 
exchange and improving the efficiency of asset allocation in the economy (Kiyotaki, Wright 1989 and 
1993; Trejos, Wright 1995; see also surveys by Rupert et al. 2000; Shi 2006). Most search-theoretic 
monetary models do not allow to analyze inflation’s impact on capital accumulation because they 
do not include capital as a special good. The few exceptions are models proposed by Shi (1999) and 
Aruoba, Waller and Wright (2009). However, the level of analytical complexity of these models makes 
them insoluble even after including the basic relationships from other areas of macroeconomic theory 
(e.g. search models with capital are analyzed also by Menner (2005) Molico, Zhang (2006), but these 
authors provide numerical solutions only). As a result, also in the case of these models, the direction 
of inflation’s impact on real variables, including its impact on investment, depends on assumptions 
that do not easily yield to unambiguous empirical verification (see e.g. Shi 2006, who makes a critical 
assessment of the conclusions of the model by Shi 1999). As a consequence they also do not allow to 
identify the most important channels through which inflation impacts capital accumulation. 
 
3. Inflation – capital market – investment
The main conclusion from monetary growth models, i.e. the lack of an unambiguous relationship 
between investment and inflation, is contradictory to the results of most empirical research (to 
be discussed further in the article). This research usually indicates that inflation leads, at least 
from a certain level upwards, to lower productivity of investment. Although one can find studies 
according to which inflation, as long as it is low, does not have a statistically significant impact on 
economic performance, it is difficult to point to any solid research that would ascertain a positive 
relationship  between  economic  performance  and  high  inflation  (see  e.g.  Levine,  Renelt  1992; 
Fischer 1993; Barro 1995; Bruno, Easterly 1998; Li, Zou 2002; Fountas, Karanasos, Kim 2006).
  A possible reason for the discrepancy between the model-based descriptions discussed in the 
previous section and stylized facts about the inflation-investment relationship is that monetary 
growth  models  assume  far  too  simplistic  a description  of  the  conditions  in  which  economic 
agents make decisions. A common feature of these models (with the exception of search-theoretic 
monetary models) is the assumption of no market imperfections. In the present section we discuss 
inflation’s  effect  on  corporate  investment  in  the  presence  of  one  of  the  market  imperfections, 
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3.1. The importance of information asymmetry
The  existence  of  financial  institutions  is  economically  reasonable  only  when  one  relaxes  the 
assumption of perfect information, characteristic of the neoclassical approach (the rationale for the 
existence of financial intermediaries is, of course, their ability to reduce transaction costs and the 
risk connected with investment, but Freixas and Rochet (1997) demonstrate that these functions 
lose their importance in the case of perfect information). Without relaxing the perfect information 
assumption, the capital structure of enterprises does not have an impact on their value (Modigliani, 
Miller  1958),  and  hence  on  their  ability  and  propensity  to  invest.  Under  perfect  information 
investment decisions depend on the relation between the market value of an investment and its 
replacement cost (Tobin 1969), however, they do not depend on financial variables, such as equity 
capital or cash-flow. Firms do not face quantitative constraints in their access to capital as long 
as they can cover the cost of capital. It is the cost of capital that determines the size of investment 
(Jorgenson 1963). However, such a description of financial market’s functioning is inconsistent 
with empirical evidence. Smith (2003, p. 2), in his survey of financial intermediation’s role in 
the economy, concludes for instance that models that ignore the financial system’s role in the 
accumulation and allocation of capital lead to “fairly embarrassing results”. Baddeley (2003, p. 104) 
maintains that “(…) there is a general consensus that q theory, on its own, does not provide a good 
empirical basis for the analysis of investment expenditure”. According to Blanchard (1986, p. 153) 
“(…) it is well known that to get the user cost to appear at all in the investment equation, one has 
to display more than the usual amount of econometric ingenuity”.
The asymmetry of information leads to three types of problems: adverse selection (Akerlof 
1970),  moral  hazard  (Jaffee,  Russell  1976)  and  costly  state  verification  (Townsend  1979;  Gale, 
Hellwig 1985). These problems can, from a certain level of the interest rate, lower the expected rate 
of return on loans as they:
eliminate from the market potential borrowers who have the highest expected rates of return 
(the case of adverse selection – see e.g. Stiglitz, Weiss 1981),
increase the number of borrowers who do not comply with the loan agreement (the case of 
moral hazard – see e.g. Jaffee, Russell 1976; Bester, Hellwig 1987) or
increase the cost of actions that the bank must take against borrowers who do not fulfil their 
obligations (the case of costly state verification – see e.g. Williamson 1986 and 1987; Gale, Hellwig 
1985).
The resulting incentives for lenders not to raise the interest rate above a certain level may in 
turn lead to equilibrium credit rationing. Alternatively, creditors may introduce non-price elements 
into loan covenants that will counteract the problems stemming from information asymmetry. 
These  elements  could  include,  e.g.  the  requirement  of  collateral  (see  e.g.  Bester  1985)  or  the 
requirement of an economic agent’s own contribution in financing the investment (see e.g. Leland, 
Pyle 1977; Greenwald, Stiglitz, Weiss 1984 or Bernanke, Gertler 1986). As a result, external funds 
become more expensive than own in-house funds (compare e.g. with Bernanke, Gertler, 1985). This 
is so even when the borrowed funds are fully collateralized because establishing collateral is also 
connected with a certain cost. Consequently, the firm’s financial structure becomes an important 
factor determining the cost and availability of financing, and so determines the size of investment. 
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for the firm to obtain external financing necessary to realize investment or make its cost too 
high in order for the investment to be profitable. (see e.g. Kaplan, Zingales, 1997). The financial 
structure of the firm becomes important in determining the availability of financing especially 
when an adverse shock hits the economy, as explained by the financial accelerator mechanism 
(Bernanke, Gertler, Gilchrist, 1996). This is due to the fact that an adverse shock leads to a fall in 
the prices of assets that firms hold on their balance sheets. These assets serve as collateral required 
by lenders due to their inability to properly assess firms’ creditworthiness (inability caused by 
asymmetry of information). As the market value of firms’ assets (net of their liabilities), i.e. their 
net worth, falls, their ability to borrow against these assets declines (financing conditions tighten). 
Firms borrow less, which limits their investment, which in turn reduces their economic activity. 
Dampened economic activity leads to further asset price declines, deteriorating balance sheets, 
tightening financing conditions and declining economic activity. Due to this financial accelerator 
mechanism, in which informational asymmetry plays a key role, the initial negative effect of the 
shock is amplified.
3.2. The interaction of inflation and information asymmetry – theoretical results
Even if fully anticipated, inflation exacerbates the consequences of information asymmetry and 
hampers the development of financial institutions.
 First, inflation can lower the real rate of return on savings, which in turn intensifies adverse 
selection (Boyd, Choi, Smith 1996) or moral hazard (Azariadis, Smith 1996; Paal, Smith 2004; 
Gertler, Rogoff 1989). On the one hand, a fall in this rate discourages “natural” lenders from saving, 
i.e. creditors who have sufficient funds to undertake an investment, but who do not have access to 
equally efficient investment projects. On the other hand, it increases the risk that lenders will try 
to implement investments on their own and act as if they were borrowers – a role to which they 
have no predisposition. Boyd, Choi and Smith (1996) justify the assumption of inflation’s negative 
impact on the real rate of return on savings by the fact that financial intermediaries are obliged to 
maintain required reserves against deposits, and nominal interest rates can be capped by law. At 
the same time this assumption is consistent with the results of numerous empirical studies (see e.g. 
Fama, Schwert 1979; Boudoukh, Richardson 1993, Pennacchi 1991; Barnes, Boyd, Smith 1999 and 
Boyd, Levine, Smith 2001). The relationship resulting from their model between the level of inflation 
and investment is non-linear. When inflation is sufficiently low the rate of return on savings is so 
high that adverse selection does not occur. Only after a rise in inflation above a certain threshold 
does the rate of return decline so much that it triggers adverse selection, influencing financial 
institutions’ decisions about the scope of financing. But there is also another threshold within the 
interval in which inflation causes credit rationing. Above this threshold inflation becomes more 
variable, and, as a result, the variability of investment and of other economic-activity measures 
increases as well.
 Second, inflation constitutes a tax imposed on the real value of firms’ own funds (Boyd, Smith 
1998; Huybens, Smith 1999). The size of these funds bears significance for the ability of firms to 
finance investment if, in response to the information asymmetry, financial institutions require 
borrowers to finance a part of the investment with their own funds. At higher inflation rates firms P. Ciżkowicz, M. Hołda, A. Rzońca 12
must rely to a larger extent on external financing if they want to realize the investment, but lower 
own funds limit their access to such financing. These negative effects will occur even when firms 
do not hold their own funds in cash but in other financial assets. The real rate of return on these 
assets diminishes with inflation growth, which is well-documented in the literature (see references 
in  the  previous  paragraph).  The  level  which,  when  exceeded  makes  inflation  detrimental  to 
investment may decline together with the growth of capital stock per employee (Boyd, Smith 1998). 
The higher this level is, the more important own funds can become as an instrument to ensure 
a satisfactory expected rate of return for the lender: on the one hand capital is characterized by 
diminishing  marginal  productivity,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  a higher  capital  stock  per  unit  of 
labour widens the opportunities to accumulate sufficient own funds. Hamid and Singh (1992) 
demonstrate that countries with a higher per-capita income level are on average characterized by 
a higher share of own-financed fixed-asset investments in total investment.
 Third, the fall in firms’ own funds due to the inflation tax may deepen as a result of their own 
decisions (Smith, van Egteren 2005). On the one hand, the cost of maintaining a given amount of 
own funds rises together with inflation, but on the other hand, when inflation is more volatile 
a given level of own funds has a lesser influence on the probability of obtaining external finance. 
Both these effects encourage firms to lower the desired level of own funds, and exacerbate the 
negative effects of information asymmetry.
 Fourth,  inflation  decreases  not  only  the  propensity  but  also  the  ability  of  enterprises  to 
accumulate own funds because it lowers markups over unit cost (such an assumption is sufficient 
in order for the Smith and van Egteren (2005) model’s conclusions to hold). In the literature there are 
at least three groups of models explaining such a relationship between markups and inflation.
Rotemberg (1983), Danziger (1988) and Benabou, Konieczny (1994) point to a significant role 
of the interaction of inflation and menu costs and the impact of this mechanism on the markup 
chosen  by  the  firm  when  the  profit-maximizing  markup  is  known.  Benabou  and  Konieczny 
(1994) demonstrate that models of this type can predict both a negative and a positive impact 
of inflation on the markup level, depending on the assumptions that describe the evolution of 
profit as a function of the markup. However, Russell, Evans and Preston (2002) point out that the 
assumptions needed to obtain a positive dependence between inflation and the markup level in 
models of this type are inconsistent with reality.
Benabou (1988; 1992a), Diamond (1993), Gali and Gertler (1999) and Head, Kumar and Lapham 
(2006)  emphasize  that  inflation  can  lower  the  profit-maximizing  markup  directly  if  only  the 
cost function and the demand function are endogenous and depend on the level of inflation. For 
instance,  Benabou  (1992a)  argues  that  a rise  in  inflation  may  encourage  buyers  to  make  price 
comparisons more frequently than when inflation is low, which forces firms to reduce markups.
Chen and Russell (2002) and Russell, Evans and Preston (2002) focus on the case in which 
the profit-maximizing markup is unknown to the firm at the moment of price setting. In such 
conditions  higher  inflation  increases  the  difficulties  that  the  firm  faces  when  choosing  the 
appropriate markup level as well as the costs of coordinating price changes done by the firm with 
price changes in the market. The authors emphasize that the mechanism of inflation’s impact on 
the markup level concerns not only the short term but also persists in the steady-state. 
There  are  also  models  which  indicate  a reverse  relationship,  that  is,  a rise  in  the  average 
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(1994) show that higher inflation increases relative price variability, which distorts the information 
about future prices that is contained in current prices. As a result, consumers have less complete 
and less accurate information, which allows firms to impose higher markups. Conclusions from 
models of this type do not find strong empirical support, however. A negative relationship between 
inflation and the markup level has been found inter alia by Benabou (1992b), Chirinko and Fazzari 
(2000), Batini, Jackson and Nickell (2000), Banerjee and Russell (2000, 2005), Banerjee, Cockerell 
and Russell (2001), Banerjee, Mizen and Russell (2007).
 Fifth, a rise in the level or variability of inflation lowers investment productivity through its 
interaction with the asymmetry of information. On the one hand, due to the fact that when inflation 
is higher and more variable, the probability of obtaining external financing for future projects 
decreases, firms are less inclined to make R&D expenditures aimed at raising the profitability 
of potential future investment (Smith, van Egteren 2005). Even if they obtain external financing 
in  the  future,  despite  a lower  probability  of  success,  the  investments  undertaken  by  them  will 
be less profitable (a model with a similar mechanism has been proposed by Aghion, et al. (2004), 
but although they show that investment productivity depends positively on the level of financial 
market development and negatively on the variability of macroeconomic conditions, they do not 
associate  either  the  variability  or  the  financial  depth  level  with  the  level  of  inflation).  On  the 
other hand, the most productive technologies are often characterized by a relatively large scale of 
required investment, exceeding the financial capacity of a single enterprise, and by the necessity to 
freeze capital for a longer period of time. Both of these characteristics force enterprises willing to 
implement them to seek external financing (Huybens, Smith 1999). Such a conclusion is consistent 
with the observation made by Hicks (1969), who pointed out that the development of financial 
institutions was a necessary condition for the first industrial revolution to have taken place. Hicks 
indicated that most technologies that played a key role in that revolution had been invented much 
earlier. However, the use of these technologies required very large capital outlays (exceeding the 
financial capacity of a single firm), which on top of that had to be frozen in the investment for 
a long time. Thus in conditions of the inevitable asymmetry of information firms were not able to 
undertake such investments until institutions were created that provided the necessary funds. 
 Sixth, by reflecting macroeconomic instability, inflation introduces additional ”noise” into 
the evaluation of investment projects by the lenders (Baum, Caglyan, Ozkan 2004), making the 
identification  of  profitable  projects  more  difficult.  One,  but  not  the  only  one,  of  the  possible 
mechanisms  leading  to  this  outcome  was  presented  by  De  Gregorio  and  Sturzenegger  (1994). 
When inflation is sufficiently high consumers are prepared to conclude a transaction with a less 
efficient firm if they come across one, thereby giving it an opportunity to operate, despite the fact 
that there are other firms in the market that offer the same good at the same time at a lower price. 
Such behaviour of consumers is due to the fact that their refraining from making a purchase with   
a  view  to  finding  the  best  offer  is  connected  with  a loss  of  a part  of  their  money  balances’ 
purchasing power. At the same time, transactions concluded with inefficient firms decrease sales 
of goods produced by more efficient ones. As a result, although consumers’ readiness to accept more 
expensive offers under the influence of inflation allows firms to raise prices, the shift of realized 
demand towards goods offered by less productive enterprises ultimately lowers the markup, that 
is, the relationship between markups and inflation, as indicated by most theoretical and empirical 
studies (see foregoing paragraph), is preserved.P. Ciżkowicz, M. Hołda, A. Rzońca 14
 Figure 1 contains a summary of the main conclusions from the theoretical models analyzed. 
3.3. Inflation’s impact on the financial sector – empirical results
In the empirical literature one can distinguish two approaches to verifying the hypotheses of 
the models presented above. The first one concentrates on investigating the relationship between 
inflation and the level of financial sector development while assuming that the latter is an important 
factor determining the size and productivity of corporate investment. The other approach consists 
in verifying the hypothesis of inflation’s negative impact on financial sector’s effectiveness in 
mobilizing savings and their efficient allocation.
Inflation and the level of financial sector development
The results of studies within the first approach confirm that higher inflation leads to reduced 
financial depth.
  A simple comparative analysis conducted by Boyd and Champ (2003) revealed that in a group 
of 98 developed and developing countries in the years 1980–1995 the average value of the credit-
to-GDP ratio was 50% for the first quartile of inflation and 19% for the fourth quartile. In a group 
of 23 countries in the period 1970–1995 the average ratio of capitalization to GDP amounted to 55% 
in the first quartile of inflation and 12% in the fourth quartile, and the stock-market-turnover-to-
GDP ratio amounted to 20% and 3% respectively.
Figure 1
Inflation’s impact on investment – the financial market channel
Inflation
Consequences of information asymmetry
Adverse selection Moral hazard Costly state verification
The scope of financial
intermediation
Financial institutions’ ability to
identify productive investments
Size and productivity of investment
Ambiguous direction ? Decrease IncreaseInflation and corporate investment… 15
 Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2003) conducted a direct analysis on a sample of 5000 firms 
from 49 countries of the relationship between inflation and the burdensomeness of barriers that 
entrepreneurs face when trying to obtain external financing. According to their results, a rise in 
barriers to external finance, caused ceteris paribus by inflation, can result not only from increased 
credit rationing by banks, but also from more restrictive non-price loan-terms, e.g. collateral level 
requirements.
 A negative relationship between financial depth and inflation has also been found in time-
series studies (see e.g. Boyd, Choi, Smith 1996, who investigated the relationship between inflation 
and the growth in the real value of stock-market transactions, separately for the United States, 
Chile, South Korea and Taiwan).
 Quagliariello  (2009)  has  shown  how  uncertainty  on  macroeconomic  conditions,  measured   
i. a. by conditional volatility of inflation, affects lending decisions of Italian banks. Estimated 
models  indicates  that  higher  inflation  uncertainty  reduces  the  cross-sectional  variance  of  the 
share of loans held in banks’ portfolios, which indicates that making the identification of profitable 
projects is more difficult in environment of volatile inflation – result predicted by the earlier 
described portfolio model proposed by Baum, Caglyan and Ozkan (2004).
 Furthermore, studies within the first approach confirm that the relationship between financial 
depth and inflation is non-linear.
The analysis by Boyd, Levine and Smith (2001) conducted on data from the period 1960–1995 
for 97 countries, indicates that as inflation rises, the size of the financial sector declines in relation 
to GDP, but the marginal impact of changes in inflation falls. Moreover, when inflation exceeds 
15% the partial correlation between inflation and indicators of credit-market and stock-market 
activity  disappears;  inflation’s  all  negative  consequences  for  financial  development  manifest 
themselves already at lower inflation levels.
Similar results have been obtained by Rousseau and Wachtel (2002) for a panel of 84 countries 
(developed and developing) in the period 1960–1995. They used rolling regression in order to 
identify the potential nonlinearity of the investigated relationship. This method allowed them to 
find that the whole negative impact of inflation on financial depth materializes before inflation 
exceeds, depending on the measure, 10.6% (in the case of the M3 aggregate), 21.9% (the difference 
between M3 and M1) or 16.1% (bank credit).
 A non-linear relationship between financial depth and inflation has also been found by Khan, 
Senhadij and Smith (2006) who studied a panel of 168 countries (developed and developing) in the 
period 1960–1999. In model estimation they employed the methodology proposed by Hansen (2000), 
which enables one to set objective values of the thresholds at which a shift occurs in the direction 
or the magnitude of the relationship between the independent variable and a given dependent 
variable (in other words, in contrast to ad hoc methods it allows one to avoid the arbitrary choice 
of the threshold values of the dependent variable). They also found that up to the level of 3–6%, 
depending on the financial depth measure used, inflation has no effect on financial depth, or – in 
the case of one of the measures (stock-market turnover) – it even has a weak positive impact; after 
exceeding that threshold, inflation significantly lowers financial depth.
 Despite the fact that most studies within the first approach do not analyze developed and 
developing countries separately (see Boyd, Choi, Smith 1996; Boyd, Levine, Smith 2001; Rousseau, 
Wachtel  2002;  Boyd,  Champ  2003  and  Khan,  Senhadij,  Smith  2006),  one  can  find  studies  in P. Ciżkowicz, M. Hołda, A. Rzońca 1
this vein confirming that as capital stock per employee rises the negative impact of inflation on 
financial depth becomes stronger. For instance, Cuadro, Gallego and Herrero (2003) have found, 
using a cross-section sample of 134 countries, that in developing countries the impact of inflation 
on financial development was much weaker (by approximately 1/3) than in all countries taken 
together, although still negative and statistically significant. Dong-Hyeon and Shu-Chin (2010) 
using an unbalanced panel covering 87 countries in the period 1960–2005 have shown a negative 
long-run  relationship  between  inflation  and  financial  development  for  the  whole  sample  of 
countries. However, in subgroups differentiated in terms of inflation and income level these results 
hold only for low-income or low-inflation countries.
 The  results  of  the  empirical  studies  cited  are  thus  generally  consistent  with  the  main 
hypotheses formulated on the basis of theoretical models’ predictions. In order to conclude about 
inflation’s negative impact on the size or productivity of investment it is necessary to assume 
a positive relationship between the size or productivity of investment and the scope of financial 
intermediation. Such an assumption seems justified in light of the available results of empirical 
research. A full analysis of the literature on the dependence between investment (or, more broadly, 
economic  growth)  and  financial  development  goes  beyond  the  scope  of  this  article.  Suffice  it 
to say, however, that since the seminal article by Goldsmith (1969) this relationship has been 
confirmed to be positive by numerous empirical studies. An exhaustive review of the results of 
research within this strand can be found for instance in Levine (2004). Nevertheless, caution is 
warranted when making conclusions about inflation’s impact on investment on the basis of the 
foregoing results. As emphasized by Mayer (1993), econometric verification of research hypotheses 
does not satisfy the transitivity conditions. Separate rejection of the hypotheses that, respectively, 
variable A has no influence on variable B, and variable B has no impact on variable C at a given 
significance level does not lead automatically to the rejection of the hypothesis that variable A has 
no impact on variable C at the same significance level. Thus, whereas the relationships between, 
correspondingly, inflation and financial development, and financial development and investment 
can be statistically significant at a given significance level, the relationship between inflation and 
investment may not show such significance at the same level.
Inflation and financial sector’s effectiveness in mobilizing savings and their efficient allocation
The other approach to investigating the relationship between inflation, the financial market and 
investment concentrates on the verification of the hypothesis that inflation has a negative impact 
on financial intermediaries’ effectiveness in mobilizing savings and allocating them efficiently. 
The hypothesis stemming from theoretical models and tested in such studies assumes that from   
a certain level higher inflation lowers the financial sector’s ability to identify ways of the most 
productive capital use. We are, however, unaware of studies analyzing inflation’s direct effect 
on the strength of the relationship between productivity and the size of investment on the one 
hand, and financial depth on the other hand. The existing literature verifies this hypothesis in 
an indirect way, i.e. by studying inflation’s impact on the strength of the link between economic 
growth  and  financial  sector  development.  It  is  assumed  in  these  studies  that  a weakening  of 
this relationship in reaction to a rise in inflation above a certain level means that price growth 
is fast enough to limit financial institutions’ ability to identify highly productive investments.   Inflation and corporate investment… 1
As a result, at a certain inflation level the rise in financial sector’s importance in the economy 
ceases to raise investment and the quality of implemented investment projects. This, in turn, is 
reflected in economic growth’s weaker dependence on financial depth measures. Below selected 
empirical studies are discussed that verify this mechanism.
  Drawing  on  the  earlier  mentioned  rolling-regression  results,  Rousseau  and  Wachtel  (2002) 
conclude  that  an  inflation  rise  within  the  low-value  interval  leads  through  its  impact  on 
investment to a lower magnitude of financial depth’s effect on GDP growth. After inflation exceeds 
the threshold value which is equal to, depending on the financial-depth measure used, 6.5% (in 
the case of M3), 13.4% (the difference between M3 and M1) and 8.1% (bank credit), the analyzed 
relationship ceases to be significantly positive at the 5% significance level. 
 A similar analysis was conducted by Barnes (2001). He used panel data from 49 developed 
and developing countries in the years 1965–1995 while employing Hansen’s (2000) methodology 
which, as already mentioned, allows one to avoid arbitrariness when setting the threshold values. 
In a sample of observations in which inflation did not exceed 14%, financial depth’s effect on 
economic growth turned out to be positive and statistically significant. In a sample made up of the 
remaining observations the model did not confirm the existence of a relationship between these 
two variables.
 Hansen’s (2000) methodology was also used by Lee and Wong (2005), who applied it to quarterly 
data for Taiwan in the years 1965–2002 and for Japan in the years 1970–2001. In their study the 
relationship between economic growth and the financial-market development index turned out to 
be statistically significant solely for inflation not exceeding 7.2% in the case of Taiwan and 9.7% in 
the case of Japan. A lower threshold value for inflation in the less developed country (Taiwan) than 
in the more developed one (Japan) can be explained (at least) in two ways. First, a yearly growth 
rate of a certain monetary aggregate was used as a proxy for financial development, whereas most 
research measures financial development with the ratio of a certain monetary aggregate to GDP. In 
the case of the measure employed by Lee and Wong (2005) an important role in gauging its impact 
on economic growth at different levels of inflation can be played by the initial level of financial 
development. Second, as demonstrated by Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000), the monetary aggregate 
used in Lee and Wong’s (2005) study (the sum of currency in circulation, demand deposits and time 
deposits) may not be a good measure in research of this kind as it does not describe correctly the 
financial sector’s role in limiting information asymmetry.
 The results of empirical research confirm that from a certain level upwards, a rise in inflation 
is accompanied by a decline in the magnitude of financial depth’s impact on economic growth. 
This  result  can  be  treated  as  a confirmation  of  the  hypothesis  that  inflation  exerts  a negative 
impact on the ability of financial institutions to stimulate investment and to identify the most 
productive projects. It should be emphasized, however, that the weakening of the link between 
economic growth and financial development at sufficiently high inflation levels may also reflect 
the impact of factors other than those included in the model. The effect of these factors on the level 
or productivity of investment may manifest itself only when inflation is sufficiently high. In such 
a situation the true magnitude of the relationship between financial depth and economic growth 
could be constant and its estimated strength would decline due to the inflation-induced impact on 
investment of variables omitted in the model. Thus further research is warranted in order for the 
conclusions formulated in the foregoing studies to hold.P. Ciżkowicz, M. Hołda, A. Rzońca 1
 The results of the earlier mentioned analysis by Rousseau and Wachtel (2002) (unpublished in 
their article) suggest that the negative relationship between inflation and economic growth can 
be interpreted as a confirmation that the “inflation – financial sector development – investment” 
mechanism is not the only channel through which inflation can negatively influence growth. 
In  the  following  section  we  discuss  inflation’s  impact  on  investment  through  its  effect  on 
uncertainty.
4. Inflation – uncertainty – investment
Investment is an activity connected with incurring certain costs today in order to obtain the 
expected results in the future. Firms must compare costs, which, in the simplest case, they can 
determine in advance, with expected results which are uncertain. Contrary to what monetary 
growth models assume, the scale of uncertainty can play an important role in firms’ investment 
decisions.
4.1. Defining uncertainty
In the assessment of the role of inflation-related uncertainty in firms’ investment decisions the 
classification put forth by Knight (1921) may be useful. Therefore, in this article we will limit the 
analysis to this classification. An exhaustive review of the concept of uncertainty within different 
decision– making theories can be found e.g. in Machina (1987), more recent theories have been 
presented, among others, in Gilboa (2004).
  Knight (1921) distinguished two types of uncertainty.
The first, known as risk in the sense of Knight or classic uncertainty refers to a situation 
in which all events that can have an influence on a decision can be assigned unambiguously 
determined probabilities, i.e. known and evaluated at the same level by all economic agents. The 
theory that describes uncertainty within this line of reasoning is von Neumann and Morgenstern’s 
(1944) expected utility theory in which probabilities are objective.
The other type, uncertainty in the sense of Knight (1921) or (following Ellsberg 1961) ambiguity 
refers  to  a situation  in  which  events  cannot  be  assigned  objective  probabilities.  This  does  not 
mean, however (which is often wrongly attributed to this definition), that economic agents do not 
impute any probabilities to these events: these probabilities are subjective, that is, they reflect the 
convictions of individual agents.
The gist of this distinction was aptly expressed by Hicks (1979, p. 107): “Risks, according 
to  Knight,  arise  from  random  sequences;  so  they  can  be  covered,  if  there  are  enough  of 
them, by insurance. True uncertainties, which he recognizes to be of greater importance in 
economics, cannot”. According to this interpretation, firms’ investment decisions are made 
under uncertainty and not under risk because in most cases the firm cannot insure against 
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4.2. Mechanisms of the inflation-uncertainty-investment relationship
Two  mechanisms  determine  the  inflation–uncertainty–investment  relationship.  The  first  one 
concerns inflation’s influence on the uncertainty surrounding those variables that form the basis 
for entrepreneurs’ judgments about future outcomes of current investment. The other is related to 
how uncertainty surrounding future profits can shape firms’ investment decisions. As these are, 
in principle, two disjoint mechanisms, we analyze them separately.
Uncertainty about variables key in investment decisions
There are several ways in which inflation can increase uncertainty linked to the variables key in 
firms’ investment decisions. It can increase relative price variability (henceforth, RPV), uncertain-
ty about future inflation and/or uncertainty about the future macroeconomic situation.
Increased relative price variability 
Several  theoretical  approaches  exist  that  provide  a rationale  for  such  inflation’s  role  in 
increasing RPV.
Menu cost models (cf. e.g. Sheshinski, Weiss 1977; Rotemberg 1983, Benabou 1992a) explain it 
by discontinuous price adjustments resulting from costs connected with such changes. In a model 
economy, firms change prices according to the (S, s) rule: the nominal price set by a firm is kept 
constant until the relative price reaches the level of s, then the nominal price is raised until it 
reaches the level at which the relative price equals S. The higher the inflation, the larger the 
difference between the values of s and S, and, as a result, the more variable the relative prices.
Signal extraction models (Lucas 1972; Barro 1976; Hercowitz 1981) relate changes in RPV to 
unexpected changes in inflation. Such unexpected changes in inflation make aggregate demand 
shifts less predictable, which encourages firms to limit the scale of supply adjustments in reaction 
to all shocks, including idiosyncratic demand shifts. In order to equilibrate the more variable 
demand with the less variable supply, price changes in each market must be larger.
Multisector  general  equilibrium  models  indicate  that  inflation  may  lead  to  a rise  in  RPV 
through  technological  shocks  correlated  across  sectors  (Balke,  Wynne  2000).  Whereas  the 
previously discussed models explain the existence of a short-run relationship between inflation 
and RPV, Balke and Wynne demonstrate that this may be a long-run relationship.
The relationship between inflation and RPV has been a subject of empirical research for a very 
long time. The following general conclusions can be drawn from this line of research.
The relationship between inflation and RPV is positive and statistically significant. Nautz and 
Scharff (2005) analyze the results of 11 studies confirming this relationship. Out of the 15 studies 
analyzed by Banerjee, Mizen and Russell (2007), only 4 did not confirm this relationship. On the 
basis of their literature review, Binette and Martel (2005) conclude that this relationship has almost 
become a stylized fact.
Inflation’s impact on RPV is significant even when inflation is low or moderate. A confirmation 
of inflation’s positive impact on RPV has been obtained for countries which did not experience 
episodes of high (above 30%) inflation in the investigated periods. These countries include, for 
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Chang, Cheng 2000), the United Kingdom (e.g. Banerjee, Mizen, Russell 2007), as well as the euro 
area (Nautz, Scharff 2006; Caporale, Onorante, Paesani 2010).
This relationship can exist not only in the short-, but also in the long-run (see e.g. Parsley 1996; 
Nath 2003).
Inflation’s effect on RPV can also be non-linear (see Nautz, Scharff 2006).
Higher RPV increases uncertainty related to investment decisions at least in two ways.
On  the  one  hand,  it  is  more  difficult  for  entrepreneurs  to  assess  the  current  and  future 
relations between the prices of goods produced by them and the prices of intermediate, substitute 
or complementary goods. As a result, it is more difficult for them to determine what is and what is 
not worth producing.
On the other hand, the number and the average duration of long-term contracts diminishes. 
These contracts eliminate a sizable part of the uncertainty about the future level of demand and 
prices, and, as a result, reduce the uncertainty about future profits from started investments (see 
e.g. Reagan, Stulz 1993; Guerrero 2005).
Uncertainty about future inflation 
Inflation leads to higher inflation uncertainty, understood as the possibility of unexpected 
higher inflation rates in the future. In the literature several theoretical approaches can be found 
that explain this phenomenon.
Ball (1992) describes it as a result of a game between economic agents and monetary policy 
makers. When inflation is low, policymakers prefer to keep it at a low level. However, if inflation is 
high those policymakers who believe in a short-term trade-off between inflation and unemployment 
may not be determined enough to take necessary steps to lower inflation. Economic agents do not 
know  what  kind  of  monetary  policy  will  be  pursued  in  high-inflation  conditions.  The  higher 
the inflation, the higher the uncertainty about the direction of monetary policy and the future 
inflation level.
Holland (1993a) finds that the relationship between current inflation and the uncertainty about 
its future level results not so much from the uncertainty surrounding future monetary policy, but 
rather from the uncertainty about monetary policy transmission to inflation. He demonstrates 
that if there is uncertainty about the length of the monetary policy transmission lag, uncertainty 
about the level of future inflation is positively correlated with current inflation squared.
Evans and Wachtel (1993) and Holland (1993b) explain the existence of this dependence with 
uncertainty about the parameters of the process describing inflation. They show that if economic 
agents are uncertain about inflation persistence, the uncertainty surrounding future inflation is an 
increasing function of current inflation. Such an explanation is consistent with both earlier-mentioned 
hypotheses, Ball’s (1992) as well as Holland’s (1993a): uncertainty about the parameters describing 
inflation may result both from uncertainty about the direction of monetary policy conducted under 
different regimes, as well as from the strength and lags in monetary transmission to inflation.
The results of empirical studies of the relationship between current inflation and inflation 
uncertainty lead to the following conclusions:
A positive relationship exists between inflation uncertainty and inflation level. For instance, 
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inflation uncertainty was obtained in 17 out of the 21 studies he analyzed. A similar conclusion 
was reached by O’Reilly (1998) who reviewed further 10 studies from the years 1993–1998 which 
confirmed this relationship.
The relationship is causal and runs from inflation to uncertainty (see e.g. Grier, Perry 1998; 
Holland 1995).
The  positive  dependence  between  inflation  uncertainty  and  inflation  level  is  significant 
even when inflation is low or moderate. A confirmation of inflation’s positive impact on inflation 
uncertainty was obtained for countries which did not experience episodes of high (above 30%) 
inflation in the periods investigated, e.g. the United States (e.g. Holland 1995; Golob 1994), the UK 
(e.g. Fountas 2001; Kontonikas 2004), Canada (e.g. Crawford, Kasumovich 1996), or G7 countries 
(e.g. Ricketts, Rose 1996).
Inflation has a stronger impact on the long-term rather than on the short-term uncertainty 
about future inflation (see i.a. Ball, Cecchetti 1991; Evans 1991; Evans, Wachtel 1993).
It should be emphasized, however, that the measures of uncertainty used in these studies do 
not fully satisfy the definition of uncertainty used in theoretical models, expressed as the variance 
of expected inflation.
Higher  uncertainty  about  future  inflation  may  influence  the  uncertainty  about  the  future 
return on investment through several mechanisms.
It increases uncertainty about that part of future tax burdens (that have a direct or an indirect 
impact on the user cost of capital) which is determined by factors that are not inflation-indexed 
(we discuss this in more detail in the following section).
It  is  reflected  in  the  growth  of  uncertainty  about  the  future  level  of  interest  rates.  This 
uncertainty can be evoked by both fluctuations in the inflation-related risk premium and the 
difficulty in assessing the impact of taxes on the real-interest-rate level.
Finally, it intensifies the uncertainty stemming from RPV as long as nominal price rigidities 
emerge (Friedman 1977).
Uncertainty about future macroeconomic situation
Inflation may lead to a rise in the uncertainty about a country’s future economic situation. 
Fischer (1993) concludes that due to the lack of economic justification for letting inflation run high, 
authorities that allow inflation to rise can be assessed by economic agents as unable to conduct 
a consistent and stable economic policy (a similar argument is put forward by Eberly 1993). As 
a result, economic agents’ decisions may depend directly on the inflation level even when inflation 
does not have a direct impact on the uncertainty about the factors that should be considered when 
taking these decisions. Such a relationship is characteristic of models in which the behavior of 
economic agents depends on “self-fulfilling prophecies” and “sunspots” (cf. e.g. Woodford 1990; 
Farmer 1993). A “sunspot equilibrium” arises when a variable that has no unambiguous (direct 
or indirect) effect on the economy, exerts such an influence because economic agents believe that 
such an impact exists and react to changes in the values of this variable. We are, however, unaware 
of any empirical research confirming that economic agents indeed perceive inflation in this way. 
Both economic theory and the results of empirical research point to several channels through 
which inflation intensifies the uncertainty surrounding those variables that influence the results 
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Uncertainty about future profits from investment
The above described mechanisms can have an effect on firms’ investment decisions only when 
uncertainty constitutes a significant determinant of investment. We analyze this further in this 
section.
 
Uncertainty about future profits from investment – theoretical results
The  predictions  of  theoretical  models  as  to  the  direction  of  this  relationship  do  not  give 
a straight and unambiguous answer.
In some models in which it is assumed that economic agents make decisions under uncertainty, 
their decision-making problem is formulated in such a way, so as to de facto eliminate uncertainty and 
its effects. An example of such an approach is the model of Lucas and Prescott (1971), in which it is 
assumed that all possible states of nature are foreseen by economic agents under rational expectations. 
As a result, the model does not predict any impact of changes in uncertainty on investment, as by 
assumption it is based on a “(…) theory linking current investment to observable current and past 
explanatory variables, rather than to ‘expected’ future variables” (Lucas, Prescott 1971).
Other  models  (e.g.  Hartman  1972;  Abel  1983),  in  which  the  uncertainty  connected  with 
investment is irreducible, offer the counterintuitive conclusion that a rise in uncertainty about 
the future price level leads to an increase in investments started by a firm. These models assume 
that there is perfect competition between firms, the production function exhibits constant returns 
to scale and that capital adjustment is costly, which allows labor inputs to be adjusted to price 
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changes  more  flexibly  than  capital  inputs.2  Under  such  assumptions  the  marginal  product  of 
capital changes more than prices – it is a convex function of the price. In this case, assuming 
firms are risk-neutral, a rise in uncertainty, given a mean-preserving spread, raises the expected 
marginal product of capital (Rotschild, Stiglitz 1970) in line with Jensen’s inequality, and hence 
also the investment rate and the optimal level of capital. 
However,  at  least  some  of  the  assumptions  leading  to  uncertainty’s  positive  impact  on 
investment are inconsistent with reality (Dixit, Pindyck 1994).
 First, most investment is partly or fully irreversible. If disinvestment is connected with higher 
adjustment costs than investment, then negative shocks have a larger impact on the profitability of 
an investment project than positive shocks (however, investment irreversibility is not a sufficient 
condition for achieving a negative impact of increased uncertainty on investment – see Caballero 
1991; Abel, Eberly 1995).
Second, entrepreneurs rarely have to choose to “invest immediately or never”. In most cases 
they  can  postpone  the  investment  decision  until  they  obtain  information  allowing  them  to 
eliminate part of the projected-related uncertainty.
 In order to take account of these two features of the investment process it is necessary to modify 
the classic rule of positive net present value (henceforth, NPV) that describes the firm’s investment 
decisions. The expected return on investment must be higher than the cost by an amount equal to 
(at least) the value of the so-called real option. The real option allows one to postpone investment 
implementation  until  new  information  about  the  determinants  of  the  project’s  profitability  is 
available, and, as a result, makes it possible to avoid the cost connected with maintaining too 
large a capital stock (McDonald, Siegel 1987; Abel et al. 1996). As the value of this option is due 
to the opportunity to avoid negative consequences of investment decisions, it is determined solely 
by potential negative shocks. The real option concept reflects the bad news principle formulated 
by Bernanke (1983), according to which, the decision to start an investment is sensitive only to 
the expected severity of unfavourable states of nature. Numerical solutions of real-option models 
indicate that the value of such an option can be significant even at a relatively low uncertainty 
level. As a result, this concept can also be helpful in explaining why the hurdle rate of return, that 
is the expected rate of return, after exceeding which a firm is inclined to start an investment, is in 
practice many times higher than the cost of capital (Summers 1988).
 Model results obtained in the analysis of a single firm cannot be mechanically generalized 
to  the  whole  sector  or  economy.  Nevertheless,  the  assertion  that  uncertainty  can  have 
significant effects on investment also in the aggregate, can be justified – in at least two ways 
(Bernanke 1983).
2    The impact of uncertainty on firm behavior has also been analyzed within the framework of models assuming a lack 
of capital-adjustment costs. The lack of adjustment costs eliminates the intertemporal element from the optimization 
problem. As a result, it can be reduced to the static problem. Furthermore, the lack of adjustment costs allows the firm to 
adjust immediately (i.e. in the same unit of time) the current capital level to the optimal level, which means that the invest-
ment rate is infinite. And so the investment function does not exist. Models without capital-adjustment costs have thus 
concentrated on the assessment of uncertainty’s impact on the optimal output level (Sandro 1971; Leland 1972) or on the 
optimal labour-to-capital ratio (Holthausen 1976; Das 1980). Generally speaking, the direction of uncertainty’s impact on 
these magnitudes depends on the assumption about the firm’s aversion to risk: for a risk averse firm uncertainty decreases 
(increases) the optimal output level and the labour-to-capital ratio, whereas for a risk-neutral firm a change in uncertainty 
does not have an impact on these magnitudes. Such a result can be hardly regarded as a realistic picture of uncertainty’s 
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 First, while the effects of idiosyncratic uncertainty may offset each other at the macro level, 
the consequences of uncertainty related to macroeconomic factors may not. Such a conclusion 
is consistent with the argumentation put forward by Pindyck (1993) and Caballero and Pindyck 
(1996). They showed that investment irreversibility is a sufficient condition for the existence of 
a negative impact of uncertainty on investment at the industry level, as long as this impact is 
characterized by freedom of entry into the market, and that uncertainty concerns many firms, 
not just one. Given such assumptions the positive effects of potential aggregate shocks are limited 
by new firms entering the market, while the consequences of negative shocks affect only those 
firms already present in the market. Being aware of this mechanism, firms react only to a rise 
in the probability of unfavourable outcomes in the future. This leads to lower investment, both 
at the individual-firm level and in the whole industry. An important illustration of aggregate 
uncertainty’s  role  in  shaping  investment  is  the  uncertainty  surrounding  the  future  interest-
rate level. Ingersoll and Ross (1992) have demonstrated that this type of uncertainty causes an 
increase in the value of the option to invest. In other words, this uncertainty encourages firms 
to abandon investment, even if they have perfect certainty about the other determinants of cash 
flows generated by this investment.
Second, the mechanism based on investment decisions of individual firms can make the effects 
of uncertainty experienced by these firms “spill over” to the macro level. If we assume that ex ante 
enterprises cannot differentiate correctly between temporary and permanent demand changes, 
then the abandonment of investments by some firms under the influence of higher uncertainty, 
may, through lowering demand in the economy, encourage other firms to cut investment as well 
(Bernanke 1983). Similarly, Bertola and Caballero (1994) show that idiosyncratic uncertainty in 
conjunction  with  investment  irreversibility  has  a significant  impact  on  investment  growth  at 
the aggregate level if only firms do not make constant adjustments to the capital level (which is 
consistent with reality). Serven (1997), on the other hand, concludes that the impact of aggregate 
uncertainty on the level of investment in the economy can be nonlinear and may depend on such 
factors as the size of idiosyncratic uncertainty.
Uncertainty about future profits from investment – empirical results 
Due  to  the  ambiguity  of  conclusions  drawn  from  these  models  only  empirical  results  can 
provide  the  answer  to  the  question  of  the  direction  and  strength  of  uncertainty’s  impact  on 
investment (Cecchetti 1993). Below we concentrate on studies analyzing the dependence between 
investment and inflation-induced uncertainty (a review of research on the impact on investment 
of uncertainty related to factors other than inflation can be found in Carruth, Dickerson, Henley 
2002; Bo, Lensink, Sterken 2001).
 The principal weakness of empirical research is that due to uncertainty’s nature none of the 
uncertainty measures used can be a “perfect” measure, that is, one reflecting ex post the actual 
uncertainty that entrepreneurs perceived ex ante. These measures are constructed on the basis of 
one of the following three methods.
First, in some studies simple ex post variability measures of analyzed variables are used to 
approximate uncertainty (such an approach was followed e.g. by Serven, Solimano 1993; Pindyck, 
Solimano  1993;  Yeyati  1996;  Serven  1997).  Associating  uncertainty  with  variability  has,  inter 
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a credible disinflation policy) occur in a situation of low uncertainty among economic agents. And 
conversely, perceived uncertainty can be high in a situation of low ex post variability of inflation 
(e.g. in the case of an announced but unsuccessful disinflation policy).
The second approach is based on the rational-expectations paradigm and consists in estimating 
a model describing a variable’s behaviour in time and in approximating the uncertainty related to 
this variable with the variance of the model’s residuals (this measure was used e.g. by Huizinga 
1993; Ghosal, Loungani 1996; Serven 1998; Kalckreuth 2000). Even a superficial review of the 
literature on modeling economic variables indicates that economists simultaneously employ many 
competitive models describing the same magnitude. Assuming that entrepreneurs use only one 
type of model leads to an underestimation of the actual uncertainty level (Frydman, Goldberg 
2007). This problem is exacerbated by the fact that each type of model is sensitive to changes to 
its specification. Finally, the adequacy of an uncertainty measure obtained in the estimation of 
a model of a given variable is undermined also by the fact that the measure is always based on 
historical data, and, as a result, does not allow to include information about the future which 
economic agents could have at a given moment. 
The  third  approach  consists  in  estimating  uncertainty  with  the  use  of  data  containing 
information  about  economic  agents’  expectations  as  to  the  future  level  of  variables  affected 
by  uncertainty.  The  main  measures  used  within  this  approach  are:  (1)  the  level  of  the  risk 
premium included in the term structure of interest rates (which was used e.g. by Ferderer 1993), 
(2)  expectations-differentiation  measures  calculated  on  the  basis  of  survey  data  (e.g.  Driver, 
Moreton 1991; Butzen, Fuss, Vermeulen 2002) and (3) statistical variance calculated on the basis 
of subjective probabilities assigned in questionnaire surveys to the event of a variable’s future 
value falling within a given interval. The first of these measures has most of the drawbacks of the 
measures within the second approach as it is based on the same rational-expectations paradigm. 
In  contrast  to  the  latter,  however,  it  reflects  uncertainty  about  the  future  observed  at  a given 
moment. The second and the third measure within the third approach do not require the rational-
expectations  assumption.  Some  authors  indicate  that  measures  of  heterogeneity  do  not  reflect 
individual-agent uncertainty but the dispersion of individual agents’ assessments (e.g. Grier, Perry 
2000). Others emphasize, however, that given certain, rather general, assumptions, uncertainty 
perceived by individual agents is strongly correlated with heterogeneity measures (e.g. Zarnowitz, 
Lambros  1987;  Bomberger  1996;  Giordani,  Söderlind  2003;  Bachman,  Elstner,  Sims  2009).  The 
third of the measures, namely variance calculated on the basis of the distribution of subjective 
probabilities,  is  the  most  consistent  one,  among  the  measures  presented  here,  with  Knight’s 
definition of uncertainty. Its principal weakness lies in the limited availability of data, especially 
at the firm level.
Despite these weaknesses the following conclusions can be drawn from empirical research.
Irrespective of the measure of inflation-driven uncertainty used, most studies indicate a negative 
impact  of  inflation  uncertainty  on  investment.  Different  results,  e.g.  in  Huizinga  (1993),  who 
analyzed this relationship for the US in the years 1954–1989, concerned one variable (uncertainty 
connected with the prices of industrial production) in one of the methods of analysis used (a 
cross-section model). According to the author himself, these dissimilar results could be due to the 
endogeneity problem. In Ghosal, Loungani (1996), who analyzed 254 branches of manufacturing 
in the US in 1958–1989, the opposite direction of the relationship in question was a result of P. Ciżkowicz, M. Hołda, A. Rzońca 2
including in the study low-competition branches in which firms are price givers. In a subsample 
consisting of branches with higher competition the obtained sign of the relationship was negative 
and  statistically  significant.  A similar  problem,  namely  that  of  statistical  significance  and  of   
a change in the analyzed relationship’s direction depending on model specification, was present 
in Butzen, Fuss, Vermeulen (2002) who based their study on data from questionnaire surveys 
conducted in 1986–2001 on 2500 Belgian firms. As the sample consisted solely of large enterprises, 
of which a large proportion were price givers, not price takers, the question about anticipated price 
changes might not have reflected firms’ perceived uncertainty but their plans to change product 
prices.  This  hypothesis  is  partly  confirmed  by  the  results  concerning  the  impact  of  demand 
uncertainty on planned investment, which in almost all specifications indicated a significantly 
negative impact of this uncertainty measure on investment plans.
The identified negative relationship between investment and inflation-induced uncertainty 
usually exhibited high robustness to changes to the specification of the investment equation. For 
instance Ferderer (1993), in his analysis of US firms’ investment decisions in the years 1963–1989, 
obtained a negative dependence in all 4 groups of models he estimated.
If the inflation-induced uncertainty had a negative influence on investment, then this impact 
was  usually  strong.  In  Ferderer  (1993),  for  instance,  it  was  stronger  than  the  influence  of  the 
user cost of capital, and of the q coefficient, that is, classic variables explaining investment. In 
Serven, Solimano (1993), who analyzed 8 countries from Latin America, 3 Asian and 2 African 
countries in the period 1975–1988, inflation-induced uncertainty made the same contribution as 
GDP growth to explaining the variability of the private investment rate, that is, a variable which 
according to numerous studies, is an important determinant of investment. In Pindyck, Solimano 
(1993), who studied 30 countries (16 developed OECD countries and 14 developing countries) in 
the period 1962–1990, inflation turned out to be the only variable among the analyzed measures of 
economic and political instability which significantly and in the expected direction influenced the 
variability of marginal productivity of capital, which negatively affects investment (in Serven 1997, 
some variables describing political instability, such as e.g. the number of socio-political conflicts 
had a stronger impact on investment than that of inflation, but he investigated the countries of Sub-
Saharan Africa in which these conflicts were exceptionally intense).
A  negative  dependence  between  investment  and  inflation-induced  uncertainty  has  been 
established both in developing and developed countries, or in other words – both in high-inflation 
and low– or moderate-inflation economies. Pindyck and Solimano (1993) obtained this result while 
estimating a series of panel regression models for the years 1960–1990, separately for 6 developed 
and 6 developing countries (with the caveat that in developing countries this relationship was 
statistically significant only in those specifications in which the dependent variable was the total 
investment rate, whereas in the case of both groups of countries it could have reflected inflation’s 
impact  on  investment  not  only  through  higher  uncertainty  but  also  through  other  channels). 
Serven  (1998)  identified  a negative  relationship  on  a sample  of  94  developing  countries  in  the 
years 1970–1995, Yeyati (1996) – in 10 Latin American countries in the period 1961–1992, Serven 
and Solimano (1993) – in 8 Latin American, 3 Asian and 2 African countries, Serven (1997) – in 
the case of 40 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa in the years 1970–2002 and Fisher (2009) – for the 
panel of small, microfinance-funded firms in the Dominican Republic. In turn, Kalckreuth (2000) 
confirmed these results while analyzing German data from the period 1987–1997, Ferderer (1993) Inflation and corporate investment… 2
and Byrne and Davis (2004) – US data, in the years 1963–1989 and 1964–1999 respectively, and 
Driver and Moreton (1991) – UK data from Q4 1978 to Q4 1987. 
These conclusions suggest that inflation-induced uncertainty has a rather negative impact on 
corporate investment, thus calling into question the ambiguous results of theoretical models as to 
the direction of this relationship.
5. Inflation – tax system – investment
The  models  discussed  so  far,  explaining  inflation’s  impact  on  corporate  investment  decisions, 
neglected taxes. The tax systems functioning in contemporary economies are based on nominal, not 
real magnitudes. Hence, if taxes influence corporate investment, non-zero inflation can strengthen 
or weaken this impact. Inflation’s effect on investment through interactions with the tax system 
depends on the direction and strength of two relationships: inflation’s and taxes’ impact on the 
user cost of capital and the impact of the user cost of capital on firms’ investment decisions.
  The magnitude and the direction of inflation’s and taxes’ impact on investment are determined 
by the particular tax system arrangements in a given country, and in the case of open-economy, 
also by the relations between these arrangements and those of other countries. Generally speaking, 
the magnitude and the direction of inflation’s and taxes’ impact on investment are derivative to 
three types of tax arrangements:
nominal interest paid on the debt is treated as a tax deduction in the case of a firm and as 
taxable income in the case of a natural-person creditor.
capital gains (understood as income from shares in the company) are taxed on a nominal basis, 
without taking account of changes in inflation.
depreciation write-offs are calculated on the basis of a fixed asset’s historical cost (or cost of 
purchase), hence in a situation of rising inflation, the present discounted value of depreciation 
write-offs declines virtually in every depreciation scheme.
5.1. Inflation’s impact on investment via the tax channel – theoretical results
Drawing on the model of Feldstein, Greek and Sheshinski (1978) one can demonstrate that, first, 
by interacting with the tax system inflation raises investment by enabling the firm to deduct the 
nominal interest on the debt incurred for investment purposes (as long as the nominal interest 
rate increases with inflation). Second, inflation either lowers investment, if the capital gains tax is 
higher than the tax rate on nominal interest received by the creditor, or increases investment – in 
the opposite case. Third, it reduces investment due to the lower present value of depreciation write-
offs. The ultimate direction and magnitude of inflation’s impact on investment through the tax 
system cannot be defined a priori, that is, without taking account of the parameters of a specific tax 
system. Moreover, as Cohen, Hassett and Hubbard (1999) have noticed, this impact may be spread 
out over time and may depend more on the expected than the current inflation level if the costs 
of adjusting the capital level increase in a non-linear fashion and with the size of investment 
(these authors have also demonstrated the effects of relaxing other simplifying assumptions of P. Ciżkowicz, M. Hołda, A. Rzońca 2
the original model – e.g. that the tax rate on nominal income from shares, regardless of whether the 
firm retains the profit or pays out a dividend, is the same as the tax rate on interest income).
  Inflation’s impact on investment through its interactions with the tax system depends not only 
on the tax system’s design, but also on the objectives to which the state allocates the potential 
income generated by these interactions. Bullard and Russell (2004) have shown that even if inflation 
increases the effective tax rate on capital, the state’s allocating additional income to limiting its 
own borrowing needs can eventually lower the user cost of capital and increase investment. In 
other models it is assumed that a rise in inflation triggered by a rise in budget income leads to 
lower taxes (e.g. Feldstein 1996; Black, Macklem, Poloz 1994). 
The analysis of the direction and magnitude of inflation’s impact on investment through its 
interaction with the tax system becomes more complex in the open-economy case. According to 
Hartman (1980), with perfect capital mobility capital will be allocated to economies with higher 
inflation. But Desai and Hines (1997) have shown that Hartman’s result is a special case. If in 
the case of domestic firms the benefits stemming from the possibility to deduct nominal interest 
exceed  the  costs  resulting  from  a fall  in  the  current  value  of  depreciation  write-offs,  there  is 
a rise in domestic investment in response to a rise in inflation. The shortage of capital is covered 
with the inflow of capital from abroad. If, however, the domestic benefits reaped by firms due to 
the possibility to write off nominal interest are lower than the costs stemming from a fall in the 
current value of depreciation write-offs, inflation causes a decline in both investment and domestic 
saving. Depending on the height of the tax rate on interest income, investment may fall more or 
less than domestic saving, causing capital outflows or inflows, respectively. In turn, Sorensen 
(1986) showed that capital will not flow into a higher-inflation country if exchange-rate losses and 
gains are not taxed in the same way. Finally, in Sinn’s (1991) model a rise in inflation in a given 
country lowers investment unambiguously and causes the export of capital if there are transaction 
costs and depreciation is based on historical cost. In none of the models mentioned is the role of 
financial intermediation in the economy taken into account. Introducing financial intermediation 
into the models could further complicate the analysis. The models’ conclusions could also change 
after relaxing the assumption, weakly supported by empirical data (see, e.g. Rogoff 1996; Taylor, 
Taylor 2004), that exchange rates are driven by purchasing power parity, which means that future 
exchange-rate changes between two countries are related to the difference in inflation between 
these countries. 
 Regardless of the direction of inflation’s impact on investment through its interaction with 
the tax system, this interaction distorts the investment structure towards those types of assets or 
economy sectors in which the cost of capital (and hence the relative attractiveness of investment) 
depends to a lesser degree on inflation. The main mechanism of inflation’s impact on the structure 
of investment is its effect on the discounted value of depreciation write-offs.
In the simplest case, described by Fischer and Modigliani (1980), long-lived capital goods are 
substituted with short-lived ones, because the longer the depreciation period for a good, the more 
the inflation lowers the value of depreciation write-offs. But Auerbach (1978; 1981) demonstrated 
that  if  a good  depreciates  exponentially  and  depreciation  write-offs  are  made  according  to 
economic depreciation (that is the actual depreciation of a fixed asset), the user cost of capital will 
be more sensitive to changes in inflation in the case of short-lived goods, causing substitution 
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Hubbard (1999) and Cohen and Hassett (1999) have shown that the result obtained by Auerbach is 
sensitive to changes to the assumption concerning the depreciation scheme. Intuitively, whether 
inflation raises to a higher degree the cost of goods with a shorter or longer depreciation period 
depends on the outcome of the interplay of two opposite effects. On the one hand, the purchasing 
power of a depreciation write-off made on the basis of the cost of purchase is the lower the further 
from the moment of purchase is the moment of making the write-off, which works against long-
lived capital goods. On the other hand, the income from using a fixed asset consists of two parts: 
the first, insensitive to inflation, resulting from using the good in the production process, and 
the second, sensitive to inflation, resulting from depreciation write-offs. The second effect works 
against short-lived capital goods as in the case of these goods a larger share of income is sensitive 
to inflation changes (see also e.g. Howitt (1996), who shows the impact of inflation, through its 
interaction with the tax system, on capital allocation between particular sectors and firms). 
 The inflation – taxes interaction which arises when there is a lack of a full indexation of 
the tax system is not irrelevant to investment decisions of enterprises. Figure 3 illustrates this 
mechanism.
  
5.2. Inflation’s impact on investment via the tax channel – results of empirical 
studies
The direction and the magnitude of inflation’s effect on investment through the tax channel depend, 
inter alia, on the structure of the tax system; hence they cannot be unambiguously determined on 
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theoretical grounds. One of the first to investigate empirically the strength of inflation’s impact on 
investment through the tax system was Feldstein (1980). In each of the approaches employed (the 
estimation of net investment’s dependence on, respectively, the real rate of return on investment, 
or on the difference between the maximum net potential return (MNPR) and the cost of capital; or 
the calibration of Hall and Jorgenson’s (1967) modified neoclassical model of investment), he found 
a strong negative impact of the inflation–tax system interaction on investment in the United States 
in the years 1953–1978. This effect was found responsible for even a half of the decline in the US 
investment rate in the 1970s. In another study, Feldstein (1981) showed using the example of the US 
in the years 1960–1979 that taking account of the effects of the interaction between inflation and 
taxes in the calculation of the cost of capital may change the assessment of the impact of monetary 
policy changes on the cost of financing investment. Moreover, depending on the type of capital 
good, the same policy may either raise or lower the cost of its financing. The method proposed 
by Feldstein (1980; 1996) which consisted in calibrating Hall and Jorgenson’s (1967) model was 
subsequently used by other economists, e.g. by Bakhshi, Haldane and Hatch (1998) who studied 
the British economy and reached similar conclusions.
The results obtained by Feldstein have been subject to criticism by Chirinko (1987), who argued 
that in his analysis Feldstein did not take into account the possibility of inflation-induced growth 
in the relative value of capital in relation to other goods. Feldstein (1987) concluded, however, that 
the modification proposed by Chirinko did not improve the description of investment: the capital 
gains anticipated by firms due to a rise in the relative value of capital relative to other goods do not 
themselves constitute a significant determinant of firms’ decisions.
 The analysis based on a partial equilibrium model was extended by Cohen, Hassett and 
Hubbard (1999). By calibrating the model to US data (hence the conclusions cannot be extended 
to economies with tax systems that are significantly different from the American one), they 
concluded that in a closed economy a given rise in inflation raises the user cost of capital by the 
same amount regardless of the initial inflation level. In the open-economy case, the direction of 
inflation’s impact on the user cost of capital depends on the method of financing the marginal 
capital  unit:  if  capital  is  financed  with  share  issues,  inflation’s  impact  is  similar  to  that  in 
a closed economy. If, however, investment is financed with debt, then a rise in inflation leads to 
a decline in the user cost of capital. The impact of inflation on the user cost of capital depends 
on the type of goods and their depreciation periods – mainly due to the differences in methods, 
according to which they can be depreciated. However, inflation-induced changes in the structure 
of  investment  do  not  bear  much  significance  for  economic  growth  and  welfare.  Anticipated 
changes in inflation lead to significant changes in the user cost of capital before the changes in 
inflation even begin.
The weaknesses of the partial-equilibrium approach of the foregoing research were highlighted 
by Bullard and Russell (2004). By calibrating a general equilibrium model for the United States 
they demonstrated that a rise in inflation can encourage firms to significantly raise investment, 
if only one assumes that the government allocates the additional funds obtained through a rise 
in the effective tax on capital income to lowering borrowing needs. Even though the authors did 
a robustness check for changes to some of the model’s parameters, the strong rise in investment in 
reaction to a small change in inflation may raise doubts, at least in light of the literature on fiscal 
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 One of the few analyses of the effects of the interaction between inflation and the tax system 
going beyond the case of a single country was conducted by Bayoumi and Gagnon (1996). While 
attempting to verify the hypothesis concerning the direction of inflation’s impact on investment 
through the tax channel in an open economy, they estimated the magnitude of inflation’s direct 
impact on the size of net financial assets. The relationship obtained by them turned out to be 
negative and statistically significant in a cross-section analysis of data from 18 OECD countries 
in the years 1981–1989, and in the case of 2 out of the 6 countries in the studied sample with the 
smallest barriers to capital flows, for which a time series analysis was performed. This relationship 
did not necessarily reflect inflation’s positive impact on investment as the same result would 
have  been  obtained  if  inflation  caused  a fall  in  domestic  saving  instead  of  a rise  in  domestic 
investment.
6. Summary and conclusions for monetary policy
Inflation’s negative impact on investment is one of the reasons why price stability should be the 
main goal of monetary policy. Although research into the various individual channels of inflation’s 
effect on investment has been prolific, there seems to be a lack of survey articles which would 
analyze the results of this research systematically and comprehensively.
 Proper understanding and modelling of how inflation affects investment is not straightforward, 
among others due to the multitude and complexity of channels of this impact, as well as due to 
difficulties with ensuring that economic models produce robust results. For instance, traditional 
monetary models with exogenous growth do not allow economists to determine unambiguously 
the direction of the relationship between inflation and investment. Regardless of the formal way 
of introducing money into these models, the direction of the relationship between investment and 
inflation hinges critically on arbitrary, that is, difficult to be verified empirically, assumptions (such 
as the signs of cross derivatives of production or utility functions). A change to these assumptions 
leads to a reversal in the direction of the relationship even within the same model. The main 
reason why it is problematic to determine unambiguously the direction of the relationship between 
inflation and investment on the basis of monetary growth models is that they do not take account 
of market imperfections such as informational asymmetries, uncertainty and nominal rigidities in 
tax systems. In light of empirical results these imperfections can constitute significant channels of 
inflation’s impact on investment.
 Once information asymmetry between economic agents in the process of financing investment 
is taken into account, financial sector development gains importance. Financial sector’s principal 
role is neutralizing the effects of this asymmetry, such as adverse selection, moral hazard and costly 
state verification. Inflation, even within the low– or moderate-value interval, makes performing 
this task more difficult for financial institutions. Inflation can lower the real rate of return on 
savings, and, as a result, discourage from saving and encourage taking out loans, including by 
persons who are unable to repay them. Moreover, it constitutes a tax imposed on the real value 
of firms’ own funds which must often be used in the investment as a prerequisite in order for the 
firm to obtain external financing. Inflation lowers not only the propensity but also the ability of 
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are less ambiguous than theory). At the same time, it introduces additional “noise” to the lenders’ 
evaluation of investment projects, by making it more difficult to identify profitable projects. In light 
of both theory and empirical research inflation changes in the low-value interval do not influence 
the scope of financial intermediation. Once a certain low threshold is exceeded, however, a further 
increase in inflation hampers the development of financial intermediation. Inflation’s all negative 
effects on the financial sector manifest themselves at moderate inflation rates. Furthermore, in 
developed  countries  inflation’s  negative  impact  on  the  financial  sector,  and  further  –  on  firm 
investment, is revealed at an inflation level lower than in developing countries. This strand of 
literature is, however, relatively new: the main theories and concepts were developed in the mid-
1990s and the majority of empirical research was conducted after the year 2000. Hence caution is 
warranted with respect to these results and conclusions drawn from them as the number of studies 
investigating the issue at hand is still limited.
 The second important mechanism of inflation’s impact on investment is its impact on the 
uncertainty  surrounding  the  future  values  of  variables  crucial  to  firms’  investment  decisions. 
Inflation’s  impact  on  investment  through  uncertainty  depends  on  two,  in  principle  disjoint, 
relations. On the one hand, it is derivative to inflation’s influence on the uncertainty related to 
those variables on the basis of which firms formulate their assessments of future investment profits. 
The conclusions drawn from a review of theoretical and empirical literature are unambiguous 
here:  inflation,  even  in  the  low–  and  moderate-value  interval  constitutes  a significant  source 
of  uncertainty.  On  the  other  hand,  inflation’s  impact  on  investment  through  its  influence  on 
uncertainty is determined by investment’s dependence on the uncertainty about the profits from 
investment. Even though we may intuitively be inclined to draw the conclusion that the higher 
the uncertainty the lower the propensity of firms to start new investments, this relationship is not 
clear-cut in light of theory. Most empirical research indicates, however, that a rise in inflation, 
by increasing the uncertainty surrounding investment decisions of firms, lowers (strongly) firms’ 
propensity  to  invest.  However,  these  results  must  be  treated  with  caution,  mainly  due  to  the 
limitations and imperfections of the measures of entrepreneurs’ perceived uncertainty used in 
these models.
The third important mechanism of inflation’s impact on corporate investment are its interactions 
with the tax system. If the system is not fully-indexed then inflation affects the user cost of capital. 
At the same time, it can differentiate it depending on the type of capital good (length of the 
depreciation period) or on the investment’s financing structure. As a result, it leads to a change in 
both the level and the s of capital allocation. The sign and the magnitude of this influence depend, 
however, on many assumptions concerning, i.a., the detailed tax system arrangements, the freedom 
of capital flows or the way in which tax revenues are used by the government. Nevertheless, models 
indicate equivocally that due to inflation’s interactions with the tax system changes in inflation 
are not indifferent to firms’ investment decisions. Empirical research also does not provide an 
unambiguous  answer  as  to  the  direction  and  magnitude  of  inflation’s  impact  on  investment 
through its interactions with the tax system. The main reason for this ambiguity is that a large part 
of empirical research is closely linked to assumptions of theoretical models. The dependence on 
arbitrary assumptions made in these models translates into results of empirical research.
 All three mechanisms of inflation’s influence on investment are closely related. For instance, 
uncertainty  is  one  of  the  reasons  why  markets  are  incomplete,  and  hence,  why  their  level  of Inflation and corporate investment… 33
development, related to the inflation – asymmetry of information relationship, exacerbates the 
effects of uncertainty. Finally, the effects of both uncertainty and information asymmetry can 
be amplified by inflation’s interactions with the tax system. Whereas the links between the first 
two mechanisms are emphasized in the literature, the third mechanism is analyzed in complete 
isolation  from  the  other  two.  All  models  known  to  us  analyze  the  investment  impact  of  the 
interaction between anticipated inflation and a tax system with a defined structure, ignoring, on 
the one hand, the problem of uncertainty connected with future inflation and future changes in 
the tax system, and, on the other hand, the results of changes in cash flows triggered by inflation’s 
interactions  with  the  tax  system  due  to  the  asymmetry  of  information.  Including  all  these 
mechanisms of inflation’s impact on investment within the framework of a single consistent model 
could be an important avenue for future research.
 Inflation’s effect on investment bears great significance for monetary policy. Some general 
conclusions that can be drawn from the survey of literature on this relationship are presented 
below.
Inflation emerges as a more important determinant of corporate investment decisions than 
variables determining the user cost of capital, among them the interest rate. At the same time 
inflation’s negative effect on investment is not limited to the size of investment only, but also 
concerns its productivity.
Inflation’s damaging consequences for investment are not confined to cases of hyperinflation 
or even high (above 30%) inflation. A given rise in inflation is most detrimental to investment 
when inflation rises above relatively low values, close to the inflation targets of most central banks 
pursuing inflation targeting.
Given the importance of information asymmetry, uncertainty or nominal rigidities of the tax 
system for evaluating the magnitude and the direction of inflation’s effects on investment, models 
employed in policymaking should take better account of these market imperfections. Unfortunately, 
many structural econometric models used in central banks to forecast inflation and to evaluate the 
effects of monetary policy have their theoretical foundations in models that do not take account of 
these imperfections.
DSGE models, which have been more and more widely used by central banks in recent years, 
incorporate a number of market imperfections into a real business cycle core model (see e.g. Smets, 
Wouters 2003). Thus, they conceptually allow for capturing effects of information asymmetry, 
uncertainty or nominal rigidities of the tax system. However, it seems that as of yet a negative 
link between inflation and investment obtained in these models is most often mainly a result of 
the monetary policy rule which usually requires a more than one-to-one response to a change in 
inflation (which in many models of this class is a condition of stable solution). In the light of the 
studies surveyed in this paper the impact of inflation on the cost of capital does not necessarily 
have to be the most important channel through which inflation has an adverse effect on capital 
accumulation. Thus, there are reasons to believe that further research on how to introduce in 
practice information asymmetry, uncertainty or nominal rigidities of the tax system into models 
used by central banks could improve the explanatory and predictive power of models and hence 
aid the conduct of monetary policy.
Considering the results of research surveyed in the article it appears that in order to assess the 
effects of tighter monetary policy on corporate investment it is not enough to take account of the P. Ciżkowicz, M. Hołda, A. Rzońca 34
effects of the implemented interest-rate hikes only. One should also take into account, how a rise 
in inflation caused by abandoned or delayed rate hikes could influence firm investment decisions. 
Such  an  assessment  is  not  possible,  for  instance,  with  the  use  of  structural  models  with  the 
interest-rate rule switched off. In such models higher inflation, given an interest-rate path, results 
in a lower cost of capital, and, as a result, in higher investment.
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